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Abstract
We develop a framework based on microeconomic theory from which the ideal gas
like market models can be addressed. A kinetic exchange model based on that frame-
work is proposed and its distributional features have been studied by considering
its moments. Next, we derive the moments of the CC model (Eur. Phys. J. B 17
(2000) 167) as well. Some precise solutions are obtained which conform with the
solutions obtained earlier. Finally, an output market is introduced with global price
determination in the model with some necessary modifications.
1 Introduction
Starting with an early attempt by Angle [1,2], a number of models based on
kinetic theory of gas have been proposed to understand the emergence of the
universal features of income and wealth distributions (see e.g. refs. [3,4,5]). The
main focus of those models was to develop a framework that would give rise to
gamma function-like behavior for the bulk of the distribution and a power-law
for the richer section of the population. The CC-CCM models [6,7] have both
of these features. The kinetic exchange model proposed by Dragulescu and
Yakovenko [8] and later studied in more details by Guala [9], produces the
gamma function-like behavior for the income distribution. We note that all
of these models are generally based on some ad-hoc stochastic asset evolution
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equations with little theoretical foundations for it. Our primary aim in this
paper is to develop a consistent framework from which we can address this type
of market models. Here we propose a model based on consumers’ optimization
which can give rise to those particular forms of asset exchange equations used
in refs. [6,8] as special cases. We then focus exclusively on the asset exchange
equations and an analytically simple kinetic exchange model is proposed. Its
distributional features are analyzed by considering its moments. The same
technique is then applied to derive the moments of the distribution of income
in the CC model [6] as well. We find that it provides a rigorous justification
for the values of the parameters of the distribution, conjectured earlier in ref.
[10]. A possible extension of the microeconomic settings of the basic model is
also studied where we consider the output market explicitly with global price
determination.
2 The model
We consider an N -agent exchange economy. Each of them produces a single
perishable commodity. Each of these goods is different from all other goods.
Money exists in this economy to facilitate transactions (existence of money
is not formally explained here). Any commodity can enter as an argument
in the utility function (see ref. [11] for a detailed discussion on the theory
of utility) of any agent. These agents care for their future consumptions and
hence they care about their savings in the current period as well. Each of
these agents are endowed with an initial amount of money (the only type of
non-perishable asset considered here) which is assumed to be unity for every
agent for simplicity. At each time step, two agents meet randomly to carry out
transactions according to their utility maximization principle. We also assume
that the agents have time dependent preference structure. More precisely, we
assume that the parameters of the utility function can vary over time [12,13].
In what follows, we analyze the trading outcomes when any two such agents
meet in the market at some time-step t.
Suppose agent 1 produces Q1 amount of commodity 1 only and agent 2 pro-
duces Q2 amount of commodity 2 only and the amounts of money in their
possession at time t are m1(t) and m2(t) respectively. Since neither of the two
agents possess the commodity produced by the other agent, both of them will
be willing to trade and buy the other good by selling a fraction of their own
productions as well as with the money that they hold. In general, at each time
step there would be a net transfer of money from one agent to the other due to
trade. Our aim is to understand how the amount of money held by the agents
change over time. For notational convenience, we denote mi(t+ 1) as mi and
mi(t) as Mi (for i = 1, 2).
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We define the utility functions as follows. For agent 1, U1(x1, x2, m1) = x
α1
1 x
α2
2 m
αm
1
and for agent 2, U2(y1, y2, m2) = y
α1
1 y
α2
2 m
αm
2 where the arguments in both of
the utility functions are consumption of the first (i.e. x1 and y1) and second
good (i.e. x2 and y2) and amount of money in their possession respectively.
For simplicity, we assume that the utility functions are of the Cobb-Douglas
form with the sum of the powers normalized to 1 i.e. α1+α2+αm = 1, which
corresponds to the constant returns to scale property (homogeneity of degree
one)[11]. Let the commodity prices to be determined in the market be denoted
by p1 and p2. Now, we can define the budget constraints as follows. For agent 1
the budget constraint is p1x1+p2x2+m1 ≤M1+p1Q1 and similarly, for agent
2 the constraint is p1y1+p2y2+m2 ≤M2+p2Q2. What these constraints mean
is that the amount that agent 1 can spend for consuming x1 and x2 added to
the amount of money that he holds after trading at time t+1 (i.e. m1) cannot
exceed the amount of money that he has at time t (i.e. M1) added to what he
earns by selling the good he produces (i.e. Q1). The same is true for agent 2.
The basic idea behind this whole exercise is that both of the agents try to
maximize their respective utility subject to their respective budget constraints
and the invisible hand of the market that is the price mechanism works to
clear the market for both goods (i.e. total demand equals total supply for both
goods at the equilibrium prices). Ultimately we will study the money evolution
equations in such a situation. Formally, agent 1’s problem is to maximize his
utility subject to his budget constraint i.e. maximize U1(x1, x2, m1) subject
to p1.x1 + p2.x2 +m1 = M1 + p1.Q1. Similarly for agent 2, the problem is to
maximize U1(y1, y2, m2) subject to p1.y1 + p2.y2 +m2 = M2 + p2.Q2. Solving
those two maximization exercises by Lagrange multiplier and applying the
condition that the market remains in equilibrium, we get the competitive
price vector (pˆ1, pˆ2) as pˆi = (αi/αm)(M1 +M2)/Qi for i = 1, 2 (see appendix
A1).
We now examine the outcomes of such a trading process.
(a) At optimal prices (pˆ1, pˆ2), m1(t)+m2(t) = m1(t+1)+m2(t+1) and this
follows directly from Walras’ law [11] saying that if all but one market
clears then the rest also has to be cleared. That is, demand matches
supply in all market at the market-determined price in equilibrium. Since
money is also treated as a commodity in this framework, its demand (i.e.
the total amount of money held by the two persons after trade) must
be equal to what was supplied (i.e. the total amount of money held by
them before trade). In any case, an algebraic proof is also given in the
appendix (see A2).
(b) We now present the most important equation of money exchange in this
model. We make a rather restrictive assumption that α1 in the utility
function can vary randomly over time with αm remaining constant. It
readily follows that α2 also varies randomly over time with the restriction
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that the sum of α1 and α2 is a constant (1-αm). In the money demand
equations derived from the above-mentioned problem, we substitute αm
by λ and α1/(α1+α2) by ǫ to get the following money evolution equations
as (see A3)
m1(t+ 1) = λm1(t) + ǫ(1− λ)(m1(t) +m2(t))
m2(t+ 1) = λm2(t) + (1− ǫ)(1− λ)(m1(t) +m2(t)). (1)
For a fixed value of λ, if α1 (or α2, see A3) is a random variable with
uniform distribution over the domain [0, 1 − λ], then ǫ is also uniformly
distributed over the domain [0, 1]. It may be noted that λ (i.e. αm in the
utility function) is the savings propensity used in the CC model [6].
(c) For the limiting value of αm in the utility function (i.e. αm → 0 which
implies λ→ 0), we get the money transfer equation describing the random
sharing of money without savings. This form of transfer equation has been
used in Dragulescu and Yakovenko [8], Guala [9] and also in the model
proposed later in this paper.
(d) It may be noted that at each time step, the price mechanism works only
locally ,i.e., it works to clear the markets for two commodities (Q1 and Q2)
only. The markets considered here are perfectly competitive. Also, the set
of competitive equilibria is a subset of the set of Pareto Optimal allocation
or in other words, all competitive allocations are Pareto Optimal (see ref.
[11] for the definition of Pareto Optimality). Hence, all the allocations
achieved through such trading processes are Pareto Optimal. Also, since
the exchange equations are not sensitive to the level of production, even
if for some reason the level of production alters (due to production shock)
the form of the transfer equations will remain the same provided the form
of the utility function remains the same.
(e) Ref [13] also presents a microeconomic framework alongwith an asset
evolution equation (see also [12]). But unlike here, the asset evolution
equation for the i−th agent in ref. [13] depends on his own assets only.
3 Stochastic model A: exchange with direct transfers
We now consider an economy under government supervision. Suppose that
the government believes in free market mechanism and at the same time,
it also wishes to restore equality by taxing the richer ones. In other words,
the government does not interfere with the process of market transactions
but wishes to restore equality by redistributing income after each trading is
performed. There are, say N agents (where N is macroscopically large) in the
economy, each endowed with some amount of money (which is normalized to
unity, for simplicity) at the begining of all tradings. At each time-point the
money exchange process takes place in two steps.
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Fig. 1.
MC results of transfer model with N = 100. All simulations are done for 10
million time-steps and averaged over 1 million time-steps. +, ×, ∗ and  denotes
the cases where f=0, 0.1, 0.2 and 0.3 respectively. Left panel: Steady state income
distributions of the transfer model. Right panel: Steady state income distributions
in semi-log scale with gamma pdfs. (dotted lines).
(a) Two agents are randomly selected and they trade in an absolutely random
fashion. Note that this step directly followes from eqn. (1) above if we consider
that λ→ 0 (i.e. if αm in the utility function tends to zero). Hence,
mi(t+ 1/2) = ǫ[mi(t) +mj(t)]
mj(t+ 1/2) = (1− ǫ)[mi(t) +mj(t)]. (2)
(b) The agents agree to split the excess income. Hence the agent with more
money, transfers a fraction f of the excess income to the agent with less money.
It is reasonable to assume that 0 ≤ f ≤ 0.5. If mi(t + 1/2) ≥ mj(t + 1/2),
excess income δ = mi(t+ 1/2)−mj(t+ 1/2). Hence,
mi(t+ 1) = mi(t+ 1/2)− (fδ)
mj(t) = mj(t+ 1/2) + (fδ). (2a)
This process is repeated at each time step until the system reaches a steady
state and the distribution p(m) of income among the agents in the steady state
are studied. The emergence of gamma function-like behavior is clearly seen in
the figure [1]. It is seen computationally that as the fraction increases from 0
to 0.5, the distribution becomes a delta function starting from an exponential
one. Left panel of figure [1] shows the pdf of income for several values of f .
Qualitative features of the distribution
Substituting for δ, mi(t + 1/2) and mj(t + 1/2) in (2a) we get the reduced
equations
mi(t+ 1) = g[mi(t) +mj(t)]
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mj(t + 1) = (1− g)[mi(t) +mj(t)]. (3)
The expression of g in the above equations is g = f+(1−2f)ǫ. It may be noted
that g is a linear transformation of an uniformly distributed variable ǫ. Hence,
g is also uniformly distributed and its domain is [f, 1 − f ]. Consider now the
i−th agent only and analyze its income equation. We denote expectation or
average of a variable x by 〈x〉 and variance of x as ∆x where ∆x = 〈(x−〈x〉)2〉.
By taking expectations on both sides of the income equation, it can be easily
shown that 〈m〉 = 1 (see A4). To proceed further we derive the following
formula (see A4) that relates variance of g to that of m i.e. the steady state
money distribution,
∆m =
4∆g
1
2
− 2∆g
. (4)
Also note that g ∼ uniform[f, 1 − f ] where 0 ≤ f ≤ 0.5 which implies
∆g = (1 − 2f)2/12. So when f = 0, ∆g = 1/12 and this implies ∆m = 1
which is indeed the variance of the distribution p(m) = e−m. Again, if f = 0.5,
∆g = 0 implying ∆m = 0 which in turn implies the resulting distribution is a
δ function.
Fit with Gamma distribution
We fit the resulting distribution to a Gamma function
p(m) =
mα−1e−βm
Γ(α)β−α
. (5)
It is well known that the first two moments of this distribution are α/β and
α/β2 respectively. Comparing with what we have found, we get α/β = 1 and
1/β = 4∆g/[1
2
− 2∆g]. This fit is shown in the right panel of figure [1].
4 Stochastic model B: exchange with savings
We consider the following asset equations with a savings parameter λ
mi(t+ 1) = λmi(t) + ǫ(1− λ)[mi(t) +mj(t)]
mj(t+ 1) = λmj(t) + (1− ǫ)(1− λ)[mi(t) +mj(t)]. (6)
It may be noted that this is the equation used in the CC model [6] and has
been derived by the utility maximization principle above (eqn. (1)). The CC
model has been studied extensively though the exact form of the distribution
is still unknown. In ref. [10], it has been conjectured that the steady state
distribution is approximately a Gamma distribution [eqn. (5)] with parameter
α = (1 + 2λ)/(1− λ). Here, we give a simple derivation for this by fixing the
average amount of money per agent to unity.
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As is done in the last model (section 2), we consider the i-th agent only
mi(t + 1) = λmi(t) + ǫ(1− λ)[mi(t) +mj(t)].
By taking expectation on both sides it may be shown that 〈m〉 = 1 (see A5).
Next, by applying the variance operator on both sides and simplifying, we get
∆m = λ2(∆m+ 1) + 2(1− λ)2(∆ǫ+
1
4
)(∆m+ 2) + λ(1− λ)(∆m+ 2)− 1.
Note that here ǫ ∼ uniform[0, 1] which implies ∆ǫ = 1/12. Substituting this
value for ∆ǫ and after rearranging terms we get,
∆m =
(1− λ)2
(1− λ)(1 + 2λ)
. (7)
The proof is given in appendix (see A5). Clearly if λ 6= 1, ∆m = (1−λ)/(1+
2λ) as in ref. [10]. Hence ∆m = 1 for λ = 0, which is indeed the case for an
exponential distribution and for 0 ≤ λ < 1, the distribution is approximated
by eqn. (5) with α = (1 + 2λ)/(1 − λ) and β = α as is conjectured in ref.
[10]. For λ → 1, however, by applying l’Hoˆpitals rule we get ∆m = 0. That
explains why the steady state distribution tends to a delta function as the rate
of savings i.e. λ→ 1 as widely observed in simulations [3,6,10,14].
5 A generalized framework: trading in global market
So far we have assumed a situation where at each period two agents meet
and they carry out transactions according to their utility considerations . The
price mechanism works only locally, between these two agents to match supply
and demand of these two agents. We try to generalize the model to include
an expanding market where prices will be determined globally and the mar-
ket will be cleared globally. Here, we depict the market as a black box where
agents interact with each other indirectly through the market. In the demand
side, each agent maximizes intertemporal utility subject to budget constraint
and allocates income accordingly between present and future consumption.
In the basic model (section 2), present consumption was expressed as a func-
tion of the two commodities consumed. But here we relax that assumption
and represent both present and future consumption by the amount of money
spend on present and future consumptions. What the agents save for future
consumption earns them interest income. Hence the market grows over time.
On the production side, they can invest in production and get their returns
accordingly. Formally, there are N number of agents in the economy each tak-
ing part in the consumption and production activitites in each period. Agents
decide about future in discrete framework. The income stream generated by
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an agent is also discrete. We assume that each agent when deciding about the
extent of present and future consumption, treats the problem as a two-period
choice problem with the present (today or this week or this month etc.) as
the first period and everything after that as the second period. In each pe-
riod, each agent invests a part of his current money-holding to produce some
goods and he gets back some return from the market by selling them. Here
we make another assumption that the market is perfectly competitive which
means that the number of agents is so large that an agent by itself can not
influence the pricing mechanism of the market.
We analyze a typical agent’s behavior at any time step t in the following three
steps.
(i) Each agents problem is to maximize utility subject to his budget con-
straint. For simplicity, we assume that the utility function is of Cobb-
Douglas type. Briefly, at time t the i−th agent’s problem is to maximize
u(f, c) = fλc(1−λ) subject to f/(1+r)+c = m(t) where f is the amount of
money kept for future consumption, c is the amount of money to be used
for current consumption, m(t) is the amount of money holding at time
t and r is the interest rate prevailing in the market. This is a standard
utility maximization problem and solving it by Lagrange multiplier, we
get the optimal allocation as c∗ = (1− λ)m(t) and f ∗ = (1 + r)λm(t).
(ii) The i−th agent invests (1−λi)mi(t) in the market and produces an output
vector yi(t) which he sells in the market at some market determined
price vector pt which is same for everybody. By the assumption of perfect
competition we get that
(1− λi)mi(t) = p(t)yi(t).
The argument is roughly the following. If l.h.s ≥r.h.s, then it is not
optimal to produce because cost is higher than revenue. On the other
hand, if r.h.s ≥ l.h.s, then there exists what is called supernormal profit
which attracts more agents to produce more. But that leads to a fall in
price and hence the economy comes to the equilibrium only when l.h.s =
r.h.s. Summing up the above equation over all agents, we get
Σi(1− λi)mi(t) = p(t)Σiyi(t).
The above equation can be rewritten as
M(t)V (t) = p(t)Y (t), (8)
where M(t) is the total money in the system and V (t) is equivalent to
the velocity of money at time t. Clearly, V (t) depends on the parameter
of the utility functions λi for all agents. It may be noted that the derived
equation is analogous to the Fisher equation of ‘quantity theory of money’
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[15]. For an alternative interpretation of the Fisher equation in the context
of CC type exchange models, see ref [16].
(iii) We have considered a closed economy. During the exchange process money
is neither created nor destroyed. After all trading are done, each agent
has whatever they saved for future consumption and the interest income
earned from it added to some fraction αi(t) of the total amount of money
invested in production of current consumption. Briefly
mi(t + 1) = (1 + r)λimi(t) + αi(t)Σi(1− λi)mi(t)
or from eqn. (8),
mi(t + 1) = (1 + r)λimi(t) + αi(t)p(t)Y (t). (9)
Let us assume r = 0 and αi(t)p(t)Y (t) = ǫ(t). We get the following
reduced equation,
mi(t + 1) = λimi(t) + ǫ(t). (10)
5.1 Steady state distribution of money and price
The money exchange process of each agent is governed by eqn. (10) where ǫ(t)
can be assumed to be white noise. Then it has been shown that this process
produces the gamma function-like part as well as the power-law tail [17]. We
now consider the more general version of it viz. eqn. (9). Clearly this is an
autoregressive process of order 1 with (1 + r)λi < 1 assuming that the last
term is white noise. If we take expectation over the whole expression we get
[1− (1 + r)λi]〈mi〉 = 〈αi(t)〉〈p(t)〉〈Y (t)〉.
We rewrite the equation in terms of average money holding (without subscript)
and denoting 〈αi(t)〉〈p(t)〉〈Y (t)〉 by a finite constant C, as
λ =
1
1 + r
(1−
C
m
)
which implies dλ ∝ dm/m2. Since P (m)dm = ρ(λ)dλ where P (m) is the
distribution of money and ρ(λ) is the distribution of λ, we have
P (m) = ρ
(
1
1 + r
(1−
C
m
)
)
1
m2
. (11)
For example if λ is distributed uniformly then the distribution of money has
a power law feature with the exponent being 2. Similar argument is present
in refs. [4,17]. Ref. [17] also presents examples of the emergence of gamma
function-like behavior in the distribution of money for various types of noise
terms.
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We now focus on eqn. (8). We rewrite it without subscript as following.
p =
V
Y/M
Note thatM is of the order of N , the number of agents whose total production
is Y . In short run fluctuations in output takes place for several reasons. We
assume that both V and Y/M are distributed uniformly. It may be shown in
that case that, the distribution of price is a power law,
f(p) ∼ p−2. (12)
Hence in this model price also may have a power law fluctuation. It may
be noted that there is no clear evidence supporting the existence of a power
law in commodity price fluctuation. But it has been verified in stock price
fluctuations (see e.g. ref. [18]).
6 Summary and discussion
Our primary focus was to develop a minimal microeconomic framework to
derive the asset equations used in the ideal gas like market models. We see
that the framework considered above can very easily reproduce the exchange
equations used in the CC model (with fixed savings parameter). In a certain
limit, it also produces the exchange equations with complete random sharing
of monetary assets. Based on this model we have proposed an ideal gas like
model of income distribution and we have shown that it captures the gamma
function-like behavior of the real income distribution quite well. As discussed
above, the framework considered here and the resulting exchange equations
differ significantly from those considered in [12,13]. The utility function (in
the basic microeconomic model considered above) deals with the behavior of
the agents in an exchange economy. However, it also captures the behavior of
traders of put and call options of the same stock in a stock market. The price
of call and put options of a particular stock generally vary inversely, depending
on strike prices and expiration dates. An exception to this generalization is
periods of symmetric volatility in the stock’s price, when the simultaneous
purchase of call and put options, a straddle, may be profitable. An option’s
price (particularly the log of proportional return) is readily identified with its
utility. Further, λmay be slightly re-interpreted from determining the utility of
savings to determining the utility of protecting savings from risky trading. An
interesting question would be whether the stationary distribution of the CC
model returns in this model of option trading or not. If not, what modification
of the CC model might?
Next, we have analyzed the Monte Carlo simulation results by considering the
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first two moments of the income distribution. The same has been done to an-
alyze the income distributions produced by the CC model. Only the moment
considerations in both the models show the transition from exponential to
delta function with changes in the parameter values of the respective models
(the rate of transfer in case of the transfer model and the rate of savings in
case of CC model). Moreover, the values of the income distribution parame-
ters, conjectured in ref. [10], have been derived here only by considering those
moments. Next, the initial microeconomic model is generalized by incorporat-
ing an output market (with global price determination) explicitly. The asset
evolution equation in this context is seen to be represented well by an au-
toregressive processe which very easily produces a power law distribution of
assets. It has already been discussed in ref. [17] in details how such a process
can generate insightful results regarding the distribution of monetary assets.
In the same context, an aggregative equation is derived which is analogous to
the Fisher equation. From this equation, a power law in price fluctuation is
also derived. Taken together, these models provide a link between the standard
microeconomic settings (individual optimization and output market) and the
asset exchange equations used in the ideal gas like market models.
Acknowledgement: We are thankful to an anonymous referee for suggest-
ing several useful insights and technicalities, commonly accepted in standard
economic literature.
7 Appendix
A1: Demand functions derived from the utility maximization problem are as
follows. For agent 1,
x∗1 = α1
(M1 + p1Q1)
p1
, x∗2 = α2
(M1 + p1Q1)
p2
, m∗1 = αm(M1 + p1Q1).
Similarly for agent 2,
y∗1 = α1
(M2 + p2Q2)
p1
, y∗2 = α2
(M2 + p2Q2)
p2
, m∗2 = αm(M2 + p2Q2).
Now, we equate demand and supply of both commodities (i.e. x∗1 + y
∗
1 = Q1
and x∗2 + y
∗
2 = Q2). By substituting the values of x
∗
1, x
∗
2, y
∗
1 and y
∗
2 and by
solving these two equations we get market clearing prices (pˆ1, pˆ2) where
pˆ1 =
α1
αm
(M1 +M2)
Q1
and pˆ2 =
α2
αm
(M1 +M2)
Q2
.
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A2: Consider the demand functions for money (i.e. m∗1, m
∗
2) at optimal prices
(pˆ1, pˆ2). Clearly,
m∗1 +m
∗
2 = αm(M1 +M2) + αm(pˆ1Q1 + pˆ2Q2).
Substituting the value of (pˆ1, pˆ2) in the above equation and using that (α1 +
α2 + αm) = 1, we get the desired result that
m∗1 +m
∗
2 = (M1 +M2).
A3: From A1 we get in equilibrium,
m∗1 = αm(M1 + pˆ1.Q1).
Substituting the value of pˆ1 in the above equation we get m
∗
1 = αmM1 +
α1(M1 +M2) which can be written as
m∗1 = αmM1 +
α1
α1 + α2
(1− αm)(M1 +M2).
For agent 2 the corresponding equation is
m∗2 = αmM2 +
α2
α1 + α2
(1− αm)(M1 +M2).
Denoting αm by λ and α1/(α1 + α2) by ǫ, we get the desired asset equations
of CC model. Since the parameters add up to 1, if α1 is uniform over [0,1-λ]
then so is α2.
A4: For the i−th agent, the rule of trading is the following
mi(t + 1) = g[mi(t) +mj(t)].
Applying expectation operator on both sides, we get
〈mi〉 = 〈g〉[〈mi〉+ 〈
1
N
Σjmj〉].
Writing the above equation without subscript and using the fact that 〈g〉 = 1
2
,
we get 〈m〉 = 1
2
[〈m〉 + 1]. This in turn gives 〈m〉 = 1.
Also, in the steady state ∆mi = ∆[g(mi +mj)] = 〈x
2〉 − (〈x〉)2, where x =
[g(mi +mj)]. Note that 〈x〉 = 1. Hence
∆m = 〈g2〉〈m2i +m
2
j + 2mimj〉 − 1.
Using the fact that mi and mj are uncorrelated and ∆g = 〈g
2〉 − 1/4, we get
∆m = (∆g +
1
4
)(2∆m+ 4)− 1.
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Simplifying, we get
∆m =
4∆g
1
2
− 2∆g
.
A5: For the i-th agent, the rule of trading is the following
mi(t + 1) = λmi(t) + ǫ(1− λ)[mi(t) +mj(t)].
Following A4, by taking expectations on both sides we get 〈m〉 = 1. Also, in
the steady state, ∆mi = 〈x
2〉 − (〈x〉)2 where x = λmi + ǫ(1− λ)(mi +mj).
Using the fact that 〈x〉 = 1, we get
∆mi = λ
2〈m2i 〉+ (1− λ)
2〈ǫ2(mi +mj)
2〉+ 2λ(1− λ)〈ǫ〉〈mi(mi +mj)〉 − 1.
Using the result from A4 that 〈ǫ2(mi+mj)
2〉 = (∆ǫ+1/4)(2∆m+4) and the
result that ∆ǫ = 1/12, we get the following equation after rearranging terms
∆m = λ2(∆m+ 1) +
2
3
(1− λ)2(∆m+ 2) + λ(1− λ)(∆m+ 2)− 1.
Simplifying the above expression we get the desired result,
∆m =
(1− λ)2
(1− λ)(1 + 2λ)
.
8 Appendix - annex
This section is for record and an appeal; not for publication. We had the rare
fortune to have an economist as a referee who has been extremely supportive
of such econophysics research, unusually encouraging (see the excerpts below),
very caring yet critical (more than 3 pages of referee reports; even checking
some of the results independently), suggesting several improvements to make
the presentation more acceptable to the economists as well. There have also
been some suggestions for future research to establish the points.
The introduction of the referee report reads:
“Stochastic particle system models in which particles exchange a positive quan-
tity that is conserved (sum of quantity over all particles remaining constant)
have been shown to have stationary distributions that resemble in some ways
distributions of personal labor income and related income measures (e.g., house-
hold income). A challenge facing researchers interested in particle systems is
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to synthesize these findings with conventional economics. Working in the op-
posite direction (economic theory to a plausible function for income distribu-
tion) have been generations of economists. Since Pareto’s time, economists
have struggled to variously derive distributions of labor income, household in-
come, personal asset income, small business net income, and large business
net income from neoclassical micro-economics. These efforts have succeeded
in plausibly explaining the mean of such distributions. Explaining the second
moment is a work in progress. The most successful effort - at least the most
widely accepted as indicated by the frequency of its appearance in introduc-
tory textbooks - is the derivation of the log-normal distribution as a model of
personal income. This derivation has a well known problem with its second
moment but the simplicity of the stochastic generator is nevertheless appeal-
ing.”
“Finding how micro-economic theory implies the distribution of la-
bor income is what the ascent of the tallest peak of the Himalayas
was to mountain climbers before Tenzing Norgay stepped on to its
summit. [This paper] attempt this feat. If it succeeds, it is a land-
mark paper. Just making progress toward its objective, just ascending to a
‘col’ no one else has yet gotten to, is a notable paper deserving publication. A
number of economists who later won the Nobel Prize in economics
attempted to solve the problem of deriving a function for labor in-
come distribution, when they were young and ambitious. Their efforts
were published. No one thinks that anyone has plausibly solved the problem yet.
Until recently economists did not consider particle system models of income
distribution.”
“... [this] paper represents a clever synthesis of conservative particle system
model and familiar micro-economic concepts and equations. Such a synthesis,
even an empirically implausible one, is important. ... ”
The report further mentions:
“... The paper’s integration of basic equations of mathematical economics with
the CC model is interesting and worth publishing. The paper’s implausibilities
as economics will be apparent to economists and will stimulate tinkering with
the paper’s model. ... I [had the] advantage from having seen the paper before
publication.”
We are aware that our effort here is modest and requires further developments.
We would like to appeal to the economists, and the referee in particular, to
join the effort in establishing the ideal gas like market models (e.g., CC-CCM
models) with microeconomic foundations. This derivation of the income distri-
bution from microeconomic theory is, as the referee mentioned, long overdue.
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